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Waves of Muslim-phobia in Sri Lanka 
Ameer Ali, School of Management and Governance, Murdoch University, 
Western Australia 
Abstract 
The end of the civil war (1983-2009) in Sri Lanka has disappointingly failed to deliver any peace 
dividend. Instead, an era of triumphalism with a mood of schadenfreude entered the ruling quarters 
bringing in even more humiliation and uncertainties to ethnic minorities. The Muslim community has 
become the latest victim of this triumphalism. The ultra-nationalist Bodhu Bala Sena (Buddhist 
Power Force), a Buddhist organization led by an obstreperous firebrand monk Galagodaththe 
Gnanasara is on a nationwide rampage spreading anti-Muslim venom to cause material and 
psychological harm to the Muslim community. In the ultimate analysis this anti-Muslim rage on top 
of an anti-Tamil Buddhist nationalism is heading towards jeopardising the pluralist character of Sri 
Lanka’s democracy. Yet, the current anti-Muslim episode is only the latest of its kind. There had 
been three previous waves of such trend, the first during the British colonial regime, which 
culminated in the 1915 racial riots, the second during the so called socialist era of Prime Minister 
Srimavo Bandaranaike, climaxing in the 1976 Puttalam riots, and the third after the 1983 anti-Tamil 
pogrom. In the current fourth wave the Alutgama riots of 2014 was yet the most destructive. In all 
four waves Muslims have been at the receiving end of the onslaught. Will they continue to remain 
so? What are their options?        
Introduction 
Enterprising minorities in most plural societies invariably become the target of 
anger and envy from the majority community whenever those societies’ 
economy and polity come under internal and external pressures. Recent 
experiences of Indians in Burma, Fiji and Africa, Chinese in Malaysia and 
Indonesia are few of many examples of this phenomenon.  In the history of 
modern Sri Lanka the Muslim minority has also borne the brunt of this envy 
and anger in times of crisis as will be shown in the following account. This 
Muslim community consisting of two different ethnic groups the Moors and 
Malays, with roughly 1,870,000 of the first and 40,000 of the second is the 
second largest minority next to the Tamils, in a total population of 20,263,000 
according to the 2011 census. While the Moors and Malays account for 9.4 per 
cent of the population ethnically, in terms of religion however, Islam’s ratio has 
edged to 9.7 per cent provoking a malicious campaign by ultranationalist 
Buddhists that the country, in spite of remaining 70 per cent Buddhist in 2011, 
will be Islamized in the not too distant future. Throughout the history of the 
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island Muslims have been known for their piety, economic dynamism, and 
resourcefulness; but in times of national economic hardship and political 
difficulties all these elements have come under extreme pressure. What 
follows illustrates this commonality in four different waves of anti-Muslim rage 
in three different periods.         
The First wave c.1880-1915 
The second half of the nineteenth century was a period of religious and 
cultural awakening in Sri Lanka. Centuries of colonial rule by three different 
Christian powers, the Portuguese, the Dutch and the British, had deprived 
Buddhism and Hinduism, the two predominant religions of the country, of their 
pre-colonial primacy. Western missionaries had converted over the past four 
centuries hundreds of thousands of Buddhists and Hindus to Christianity of 
various denominations. Islam, although was willingly accommodated into the 
local cultural mosaic by the pre-colonial Buddhist and Hindu monarchs lost its 
privileges however under the Portuguese and Dutch rules before being allowed 
to thrive under the British1 .  All three religions went through a period of 
revivalism in the latter half of the 19th century. 
Of the three revivalist movements it was Buddhist revivalism that 
metamorphosed into a nationalist movement with political undertones. 
Towards the end of the century the Buddhist revivalist movement had evolved 
into an anti-colonial, anti-British and patriotic movement2 which galvanized its 
popular support by attacking the inequities engendered by colonial capitalism. 
It was in this economic dimension of the nationalist campaign the Muslim 
community and its commercial exploits received the main focus of attention. It 
was also the leaders of this movement particularly the Buddhist convert 
Anagarika Dharmapala, whose original Christian name was David 
Hewawitharana Dharmapala, first used the term Sinhala Buddhist in a racial-
religious sense.3 The political ideology that Sri Lanka is a Sinhalese Buddhist 
nation, which preoccupies the mindset of present day ultranationalists like the 
Jatika Hela Urumaya (JHU) and Bodu Bala Sena (BBS) has its origins in the 19th 
century Buddhist revivalism.       
In the 19th century economy Muslim businessmen were one of the 
beneficiaries of colonial capitalism. The plantation economy, the pre-eminence 
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of Colombo as the administrative and commercial capital, and the opening of 
the interior by a network of roads and railways created multiple opportunities 
for the development of a domestic trading and services sector. Muslim 
businessmen who hitherto were a scattered group of peddlers and tavalam or 
bullock-driven caravan traders took advantage of this opening and became a 
class of settled boutique keepers in villages and towns. For example in 1885 
outside Colombo, Kandy and Galle, there were 27 Muslim shops in Batticaloa, 
8 in Trincomalee, 7 each in Dickoya and Madulsima, 4 each in Badulla, Jaffna, 
Maskeliya, Nawalapitiya, Pussellawa and Rakwana, 3 each in Gampola and 
Ratnapura, 2 each in Dimbulla, Haldumulla, Nuwara Eliya,and Passara and one 
each in Aranayake, Lindula, Nanu Oya, Tellicoultry, Haputale, Kotmale, Matale, 
Maturata, Negombo, Puttalam, Ragala and Yantiyantota4 . According to the 
1911 Ceylon Census Report, 68,500 Sinhalese, 32,200 Tamils and 30,700 
Muslims earned their living through trade. Ali Foad Toulba, a traveller from 
Egypt observed in 1926: “Indeed, it did impress me no little in my motor trip 
across Ceylon, to notice that even in the remotest and the most out-of-the-
way villages, far from the beaten track, there, as sure as ever, was the local 
Tamby, and his very ubiquitousness reminded me most strikingly of the equally 
enterprising and pushful Greek of my own country”5.    
With the growth of towns and consequent urbanization Muslim businessmen 
and their retail establishments along with their mosques inevitably became the 
essential markers of the urban milieu. By the end of the 19th century there 
were twenty-eight towns in the island with a total urban population of 
400,0006, and in 1911 almost one quarter of the Muslim population lived in the 
Municipal and urban areas. Within this urban Muslim population however was 
the entry of a new subgroup categorised as Coast Moors or Indian Moors by 
the colonial officialdom.   
The Indian Moors who arrived in Sri Lanka were part of a general exodus of 
Muslim businessmen from the Trinevelly District of former Madras who lost 
their trading monopoly in the face of competition from Vellalans and 
Ilaivaaniyans7. For example, a good number of Indian Muslims who set up 
businesses in Kandy were from Melappalayam, a division of Trinevelly8. In fact 
the owners of the then leading firm Abram Saibo & Co. of Kandy with branches 
in Gampola, Dimbulla, Lindula and Trillicoultry had a virtual monopoly over 
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wholesale and retail business in those towns. But there were other Tamil 
speaking Muslims too from places like Kayalpatnam, Keelakkarai, Devipatnam, 
Ammapatnam, and so on from South India who were attracted by the rising 
economic opportunities of a nascent capitalist economy.  The total number of 
Indian Moors accounted for 33,000 in the 1911 census and their businesses 
spread practically into every town and village in the country. Unlike the 
indigenous Moor whose relationship with the Sinhalese population was of the 
Chinese guanxi type of long term and beyond pecuniary, the Indian Moor’s 
contact with the Sinhalese was essentially transitory, economic and profit 
oriented.  
The Indian Moor was not the only new entrant to local trading. There was also 
the Low country Sinhalese, especially the Karavas who also penetrated into the 
towns and interior villages opening up boutiques to sell groceries and other 
miscellaneous items in competition with the Moors. “It is the Moormen … and 
the low-country Sinhalese man, especially the enterprising Galle man”, wrote 
J.P. Lewis, the Government Agent of Central Province in 1909, “who have all 
the petty trade of the Kandyan villages in their hands. Every coming year sees 
the low-country man advancing along the Kandyan roads, building boutiques 
as he comes, ousting the Kandyan and spreading low-country fashions as to 
dress and speech”9.  Governor Sir Robert Chalmers in a dispatch to Andrew 
Bonar Law, the Secretary of State for Colonies captured the scenario quite 
succinctly: “The Mohammedan traders, who  come from South-India and 
return thither when they have money by retail trading, have always been 
viewed by the villagers with the feelings entertained at all times and in all lands 
towards transitory aliens who make money out of local peasantry by supplying 
their wants at ‘the shop’ and frequently securing mortgages of the lands of 
thriftless debtors. Moreover … the war has had its effect in raising prices. And, 
in a peasant country where retail prices are expressed in cents and half-cents 
… even a slight rise in customary prices is both felt and resented by the 
customer. With the pre-existing feeling towards Mohammedan traders, and 
with the recent resentment against rising prices, the Sinhalese trader from the 
low-country had opportunities for ousting his established trade rivals, and is 
known to have formed, in certain areas, Buddhist traders’ associations for the 
furtherance of exclusive interests”10.   
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Inflation, commercial rivalry, and economic exploitation naturally created an 
environment of resentment and anger between the intruders and the 
indigenous providing a convenient platform to the Buddhist nationalist 
agitators. However, instead of attacking the colonial regime and the economic 
structure that led to this explosive situation to start with the nationalists 
turned on the Muslim community as their immediate target. It is a strange 
irony in Sri Lanka’s modern history that Dharmapala, the celebrated nationalist 
hero and who spearheaded this attack on Muslims, had no anti-imperialist 
sentiments at that time and unashamedly expressed his total subservience to 
the British Throne. “True that I criticise in my articles the officials”, he said, 
“but my loyalty to the British Throne is as solid as a rock and I have invariably 
expressed sentiments of loyalty to the King”11. Ratnaweera, the editor of the 
Aryan, even described the British an Aryan nation12.  
Thus the first anti-Muslim wave emerged in an environment of Buddhist 
cultural revival, emerging nationalism and economic inequities. Even though it 
was the Indian Moors who epitomised in the view of nationalists the ugly face 
of colonial capitalism the indigenous Muslims’ support to their Indian brethren, 
in the name of religious and racial identity, dragged the local Moors also into 
the fray. The Muslim Guardian of 14 October 1904, a Tamil bi-weekly edited by 
I.L.M. Abdul Azeez wrote in its editorial: “The South-Coast Moors who are 
British subjects have a right to come and earn a living in Ceylon, a British 
country… The South-Coast Moors and Ceylon Moors are related by religion and 
to an extent by race… It is the duty of the Ceylon moors to be always helpful 
towards their brothers, who have come here to trade. Therefore the Ceylon 
Moors should do all they can in order to stop the harassment the Sinhalese 
have intended to cause them.”  
Dharmapala in his speeches and writings did not always differentiate between 
the indigenous and Indian Moors. “The Muhammadan … is an alien to the 
Sinhalese by religion, race and language. He traces his origin to Arabia, whilst 
the Sinhalese traces his origin to India and Aryan sources”13 he wrote. “There 
will always be bad blood between the Moors and the Sinhalese”14 he added 
further.  The nationalists called for an economic boycott of Muslim shops by 
their Sinhalese patrons.  
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Piyadasa Sirisena, a Buddhist nationalist wrote in the Sinhala Jatiya of 9 March 
1915, a Sinhalese journal edited by him, that: 
  “A good many of the Moors have taken into their hands various branches of 
trade in Ceylon, and they have become strong in cash. Their trade is with the Sinhalese. 
Therefore their monied power is one derived from the Sinhalese himself. This monied 
power of the Moor being (thus) not one acquired from some other source, such as planting, 
but being derived entirely from trade, it can be said that the life of the Moor is in the hands 
of the Sinhalese. But having become wealthy with our own money, and making the living 
from ourselves (the Moor) makes our own money a weapon with which to give knocks on 
our heads. Therefore the time has come for taking speedy measures to stop this sort of 
thing. We should so act to bring home the benefits of the moor derives from the Sinhalese. 
The only way for it is to come to a firm, determination, since there are Sinhalese shops and 
boutiques in all towns, villages, and townlets in Ceylon, not to buy an article worth even a 
cent from … the (Moor) … Gentlemen engaged in trade in Galle, Matale, Kurunegala, 
Ambalangoda, Alutgama, etc., where Sinhalese traders are plentiful, should handbills 
printed showing from cogent reasons the wrongfulness of buying from Moors, and they 
should distribute those handbills one each to all men and women on the road as well as 
coming to their boutiques. If action is taken on these lines, not only will the trade, unity, and 
mutual love of the Sinhalese grow, but a good lesson can be taught to the Moor.”    
Since that time boycotting Muslim businesses has become, as will be shown 
later, a conspicuous weapon in the armoury of anti-Muslim Sinhala-Buddhist 
campaignersBy 1915 however, the inflammatory speeches and writings by 
Buddhist nationalists, which began in the 1880s, had created such a mass 
hysteria that it waited for a trigger to explode into open violence, and that 
trigger came on 29th May 1915 following the Buddhist Vesak festival when a 
crowd of Buddhists attacked the mosque at Castle Hill Street in Kandy, looted a 
number of Muslim shops in the town and caused considerable damage to 
Muslim property. This incident itself was provoked by a nagging religious issue 
relating to beating drums and playing music in traditional Buddhist processions 
while passing in front of mosques. This was a frequent source of friction 
between the two communities as occurred in 1902 in Galle and in 1907 and 
1912 in Gampola. Everything culminated in the 1915 racial riots which 
occurred in 116 different centres in five of the island’s nine provinces lasting 
nine days.  As a consequence, 25 Muslims were murdered, 189 were wounded, 
at least four Muslim women were raped, 4,075 Muslim shops were looted, 350 
houses and 17 mosques were set ablaze and another 50 mosques suffered 
structural damages. In monetary terms the losses were calculated at more 
than 5.5 million rupees, a considerable sum at that time15.       
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Second Wave (1970s) 
The 1915 ethnic convulsion left no permanent marks on Buddhist–Muslim 
relations. If there was any lesson that the Muslims learnt from that episode it 
was the realisation that the future survival and prosperity of the community 
were interlocked with integrating even more tightly with the Sinhalese.  This 
lesson was openly displayed in the political behaviour of Muslim leaders in the 
post-independent Sri Lankan democracy. Muslim leadership accurately 
understood the strategic strength of their community in political terms even if 
it was the second minority. Quite sagaciously and with great pragmatism 
Muslim leaders unlike the Tamils disavowed any idea of forming their own 
ethnic-based or religious-based political party and decided to join any national 
party that was prepared to support Muslim candidates and Muslim interests.  
As Sri Lanka quickly descended in the 1960s and 1970s into a protracted and 
bitter ethno-nationalist battle ground fought between the Sinhalese and 
Tamils the importance of Muslim support to governments in power reinforced 
the political wisdom of Muslim leaders.  As a result in every legislature and in 
every cabinet since 1947 Muslims gained representation always proportionate 
to their population strength and at times even more than proportionate16.  
On the economic front the market friendly policies of the United National Party 
(UNP) Governments from 1947 to 1956, 1965 to 1970 and 1977 to 1994 were 
more favourable to Muslim economic interests than the market restrictive 
policies of the Bandaranaike regimes in the late fifties, early sixties and most 
part of the seventies.  Not surprisingly therefore the Muslim community, which 
is historically known for its expertise in trade and trade related activities, was 
more in supportive of the UNP regimes than those of the Sri Lanka Freedom 
party (SLFP) of Bandaranaikes.  It was during the 1970-77 period of the SLFP-
led coalition of the United Front Government (UFG), which included the 
Trotskyite Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP) and the Communist Party (CP) of 
the Moscow Wing, that Sri Lanka witnessed a second wave of anti-Muslim 
hysteria. It arose from two fronts, one economic and other educational.     
A popular perception until the 1970s that the Muslims of Sri Lanka, as 
O’Sullivan quotes, were “only known for two things: for eating biriyani and 
voting UNP”17 constrained some Sinhalese nationalists and politicians of the 
left to vilify the Muslim community as one of parasites who thrived at the 
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expense of the sweat and toil of others18. Taking that mindset as the political 
backdrop one needs to look at the deficit-reducing budgetary measures, the 
structural economic reforms and the import substitution strategies of the 
United Front Government19 to understand the impact they had on the Muslim 
community.  Although these measures and reforms were intended to create a 
socialist economy and society yet they carried an anti-Muslim bias in 
implementation. For example, the establishment in 1972 of the Gem 
Corporation and the Sri Lanka State Trading Corporation hit the Muslim 
businessmen harder because they took away a significant stake the Muslims 
held hitherto in gem business and wholesale and retail trade. The 
demonetization of large quite denominational currency notes in the 1970 
budget also affected the rich Muslims disproportionately because of their 
preference to accumulate savings in the form of hard currency rather than 
bank deposits because of the fear of dealing in the religiously accursed evil of 
riba or interest. 
Under the import substitution strategy textile imports from India were almost 
banned and one of the items that fell under the hammer was Indian palayakat 
sarongs the most desired piece of attire worn by Muslim men. True, this ban 
later encouraged the growth of a local sarong industry in which Muslim 
entrepreneurs especially from the Eastern Province excelled, but the initial 
reaction to the ban however was one of anger and disappointment. Also, the 
government’s drive to conserve scarce foreign exchange led to stringent 
application of the law to nab foreign exchange fraudsters. A number of leading 
Muslim businessmen such as Mowjood, Muktar, Sally and Thaha were arrested 
by the police, sued and incarcerated for breach of foreign exchange rules and 
commercial frauds20. These arrests, subsequent court proceedings and 
imprisonment received maximum publicity in the local print and voice media, 
thereby damaging considerably the public image of the Muslim community. It 
was perhaps as a measure of controlling this damage that Nalim Hajiar, a 
leading gem merchant and a foremost Muslim philanthropist publicly donated 
to the government 1.5 million rupees worth of foreign exchange from his 
Convertible Rupee Account on 14 August 197421. Even then, the cynics did not 
fail to doubt the legitimacy of his wealth since in December that year he was 
falsely charged, investigated and eventually acquitted over foreign exchange 
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malpractices22.  All in all Muslims faced enormous economic challenges under 
the United Front Government.     
More than in the economic front it was from the education side that the 
second wave of anti-Muslim hysteria received its oxygen. To understand this 
new development it is necessary to comprehend the political changes that 
took place within the Muslim community on the eve of the 1970s. The Muslim 
leadership during this time underwent a radical change and was centred round 
the charismatic personality of Dr. Badi-ud-din Mahmud (1904-1997) who was a 
founder member of the SLFP, one of its vice-presidents, and above all was 
instrumental, a fact less known to many, in urging Srimavo Bandaranike the 
wife of Sri Lanka’s fourth Prime Minister S.W.R. De Bandaranaike, who was 
assassinated in 1957, to enter politics and take over the party leadership. The 
letter he addressed to her on 19 October 1959 while he was the nation’s 
representative at the United Nations played a key role in transforming the 
widow from a housewife to a politician, leader and Prime Minister23. When the 
SLFP came to power in 1960 Badi, as he was popularly called, was appointed to 
the senate and from there to the cabinet as the first Muslim Minister of 
Education. He was given the same portfolio in the 1977 United Front 
Government also. Before becoming a minister, Mahmud, a product of the 
Aligar University in India, was the Principal of Zahira College in Gampola in the 
Kandy District. He also founded the Islamic Socialist Front (ISF) in 1969 which 
operated under the shadow of the SLFP. With nearly 100 branches and 6000 
members ISF was able to succeed in breaking the UNP-held monopoly over the 
Muslim votes24. Being an educationist himself he realised, like a few previous 
Muslim leaders such as Siddi Lebbe, Razik Fareed, and T. B. Jaya 25, that if his 
community were to progress in independent Sri Lanka it has to take up 
education in earnest and enter the various professional fields. Having 
witnessed at firsthand how his government’s economic reforms were affecting 
the Muslim community he was determined to rectify that economic loss by 
diverting the community’s energy and talent towards educational 
advancement. In the famous ‘tea party’ he held in October 1970 at his 
residence he warned his co-religionist elite guests of the impending economic 
reforms of his government and urged them to accept the socialist direction 
and take to small-scale enterprises to survive in the future26.    
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The second term of Mahmud as education minister was arguably the more 
remarkable for its educational upliftment of the Muslim community.  Through 
an accelerated programme of building more and improving existing Muslim 
schools (both primary and secondary), opening Teacher Training Colleges 
exclusively for Muslim men and women, and offering teaching jobs to any 
Muslim who successfully completed the General Certificate of Education 
(Ordinary Level) Examination (equivalent to grade 10) he radically transformed 
within a short period of time the popular image of his people from a ‘business 
community’, a description evolved during colonial times, to a ‘master (teacher) 
community’. Some statistics would help to illustrate Muslim achievements in 
education during the Mahmud era. Between 1965-66 and 1980 the number of 
Muslim schools increased from 505 to 649 and of them nearly 100 had pre-
university classes. In 1960 there were a total of 2,500 Muslim teachers (trained 
and untrained), but by 1965 at the end of Mahmud’s first term as minister that 
number had swelled to 4,000, and by 1977 at the end of his second term it 
increased further to 7,000 of which more than 300 were graduates27.  
An important milestone during Mahmud’s second term as minister was the 
introduction of the controversial standardization scheme and district quota 
system for university admissions. These measures meant that raw marks alone 
obtained by candidates in open competitive university entrance examination 
were insufficient to gain admission to university faculties. It was argued by the 
government that the new measures were necessary to redress the over/under 
representation of urban/rural students on the one hand and the over/under 
representation in the medicine, engineering and science faculties of 
Tamil/Sinhalese students on the other28. However, the standardization scheme 
and quota system proved to be manna to the Muslim community which for a 
long time had neglected higher education and therefore found under-
represented in the undergraduate population. For example, in 1969-70 of a 
total intake of 3,129 students only 107 were Muslims and of which only 13 
were admitted to the science faculties including engineering and medicine; but 
by 1977 while 153 of a total of 3,979 graduands were Muslims 41 of them 
were in the science faculties29. In the 1980/81 university intake a total of 170 
Muslims gained university admissions amongst them sixty-six were in the 
science faculties30. In short, but for Badi-ud-din Mahmud’s efforts the growth 
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of a Muslim intellectual and professional class that exists today in Sri Lanka 
would have had a much longer gestation period.    
It was this dedicated service to his community that became an eyesore to a 
section of the Sinhalese nationalist politicians at that time. Even De Silva, the 
historian’s comment that “In his hands this cabinet post became at once a 
political base and a fountain of patronage, to be used to strengthen the ties 
between his community and the party to which he belonged …” should be 
evaluated in this context of political envy and ethno-nationalism31.   
Even from within the cabinet there were bitter criticisms against the minister 
accusing him of showing special favouritism to Muslims. In fact, the Member of 
Parliament from the Gampola electorate in the Central Province where 
Mahmud lived was very indiscreet and vicious in his criticism and was alleged 
to have been instrumental in whipping up an anti-Mahmud campaign with the 
help of supportive Buddhist monks. The Tamil students in Jaffna also accused 
the minister, demonstrated violently and burnt his effigy for victimizing them 
under the standardization scheme and quota system. Mahmud responded to 
the criticisms by asserting that he was only giving the Muslims their due share 
of the national cake, which according to him was eight per cent32. He was the 
only minister in the cabinet who openly advocated an ethnic-based ratio of 
80:12: 8 for the Sinhalese, Tamils and Muslims respectively in distributing 
government funds and benefits. Factions within the cabinet conspired to 
dislodge Mahmud from the education portfolio and when one of the minister’s 
secretaries was arrested on charges of bribery and sent to prison the print and 
voice media had a field day and gave maximum publicity so that the minister 
could be discredited. Mahmud was so close to the Prime Minister that all 
attempts to oust him and tarnish his image failed completely. (I am personally 
aware of these developments since I was closely associated with the minister 
at that time.)  
However, the anti-Mahmud campaign and the publicity it received spilled over 
into a wider anti-Muslim hysteria. As De Silva noted, “by 1973 anti-Muslim 
sentiment was kindled among the Sinhalese by charges of favoured treatment 
of Muslims in the sphere of education. In 1974-75 there were sporadic 
Sinhalese-Muslim clashes in various parts of the island, with a dangerous 
confrontation at Gampola in the last week of 1975”33. The worst riot erupted in 
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1976 in Puttalam, a Muslim pocket in the north-west of the island.  The 
fundamental cause of this riot was more economic than religious or 
educational. It arose out of the controversy over the location of a bus stand.  In 
Sri Lanka as in many developing countries bus stands are usually erected either 
at the centre of a town or closer to the bazaar and shops. Petty traders, 
pavement hawkers and private taxis do roaring business in and around this 
area. In the Puttalam bus stand the majority of businesses that thrived in the 
1970s belonged to Muslims although a few Sinhalese and Tamil businesses 
were also present.  However, a Buddhist monk with the assistance of some 
Sinhalese bureaucrats was demanding for some time the bus stand be shifted 
to a location where there are more Sinhalese than Muslims. It was this 
simmering grievance at the loss of economic benefits that triggered the 
violence when, on 4 January 1976, a bus driver attacked a Muslim man who 
allegedly tried to jump the queue to enter the bus34.  The troubles lasted for 
over a month and when it subsided 18 Muslims were dead by police shooting, 
271 Muslim families lost their homes, 47 shops were set ablaze of which 44  
belonged to Muslims and 3 to Sinhalese and at least one mosque was 
completely destroyed35 (Ibid.) 
The economic significance of the Puttalam bus stand controversy was later 
reflected in the anti-Muslim attitude of some Sinhalese drivers and conductors 
who worked for the Ceylon Transport Board. Hitherto it was almost an 
unwritten convention for drivers and conductors who worked on long distance 
bus routes to break journey for refreshments and rest closer to a restaurant 
which was invariably owned by a Muslim. Even today Muslim restaurants in Sri 
Lanka are famous for serving tasty meals and refreshments. As a token of 
gratitude for bringing customers to his restaurant the restaurateur did not 
charge for the meals and drinks supplied to the driver and conductor.  This 
patronage of Muslim restaurants began to change after the seventies when 
Sinhalese drivers shifted their preference to Sinhalese owned restaurants - a 
phenomenon tantamount to an economic boycott of Muslim businesses, which 
was to become more systematic in the fourth wave.         
Third Wave (1980s-2009)  
The second wave subsided with the change of government in 1977. Even 
Mahmud after years of service to Muslims in the face of stiff opposition and 
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criticism from other community leaders was defeated, when he contested for 
the first time the densely Muslim populated multimember constituency, 
Batticaloa in the Eastern Province. The UNP was once again back in power 
under the leadership of a politically astute septuagenarian J. R. Jayewardena 
who staged a U-turn in economic policy by giving up dirigisme for a free market 
open economy – a change that was obviously welcomed by the Muslims. An 
equally radical change was his decision to abandon the Westminster 
parliamentary system in favour of a hybrid executive presidential model – a 
change that was to initiate a fundamental and dangerous shift in Muslim 
politics from pragmatism to ethno-religious-centric.  
The third wave of Muslim-phobia that swept the north and east of the island 
however, was the direct outcome of the July 1983 anti-Tamil pogrom. 
President Jayewardena in allowing this mayhem to continue for ten days and 
by viewing it as a “defensive response” and “just punishment” for Tamil 
violence against the Sinhalese36unwittingly became the ‘midwife’ not of a 
revolution, as often prematurely predicted by the leftists, but of a civil war that 
engulfed the nation for over twenty-five years. With nearly one-third of the 
Muslims living in the north and east of the country - a region claimed by the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) as the traditional Tamil homeland, the 
community was caught in the crossfire. From the beginning of their armed 
struggle the LTTE endeavoured to get the support of the Muslims of the region. 
In fact, a few Muslim young men joined the rebels’ fighting cadre. Yet, the 
Muslim leaders took a pragmatic approach and maintained strict neutrality 
between the Sinhalese and Tamil warring camps. This neutrality was shattered 
by the formation of the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress in 1985, an ethnic-religious 
political party under the leadership of M. H. M. Ashraff. The situation became 
intolerable to the LTTE and it carried out a systematic program of eliminating 
Muslim leaders including Ashraff, robbing Muslim businesses, seizing Muslim 
farms and confiscating assets owned by Muslims37.  Eravur and Kattankudy in 
the Eastern Province in 1985 and 1990 saw the worst of LTTE’s butchery of 
Muslims in the east 38 and in the north in 1990 LTTE’s action took the shape of 
a ‘final solution’ to the Muslim ‘menace’ by evicting the entire Muslim 
population of between 75,000 – 100,000 from their homes with forty-eight 
hour notice39. In the east also more than 12,700 Muslim families were chased 
out by the LTTE40. It was simply a terror campaign of ethnic cleansing. In 
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addition, the LTTE supporters also called Tamil consumers to boycott Muslim 
businesses.    
Political strategy however dictated to Governments in Colombo that the 
Muslim community should be protected and that the LTTE’s victims be allowed 
to settle in Sinhalese areas, partly out of a fear that not to do so would drive 
the Muslims to support and strengthen the LTTE, and partly to demonstrate to 
the international community that the government wants to protect the 
minorities and work with them to maintain the pluralist character of Sri Lanka’s 
democracy.  To the Muslims of the north and east the third wave was 
calamitous in every sense.        
Fourth wave (post-2009) 
With the military defeat of the LTTE in 2009 and the humiliation of Tamil 
political leadership triumphalism and malevolence invaded the victor’s 
mindset. A historical fear about the Tamil community nurtured over centuries 
by nationalistic historians and Sinhalese politicians finally seems to have 
evaporated from the Sinhalese psyche and the idea that Sri Lanka is for 
Sinhala-Buddhists and for Buddhism only with limited tolerance for other 
religions and ethnic groups, as so eloquently articulated by nationalist leaders 
like Dharmapala in the early years of the 20th century, re-emerged with greater 
resolute and political backing. If not openly supported at least benevolently 
tolerated by the SLFP-led United Peoples Freedom Alliance (UPFA) 
Government ultranationalist organizations like the BBS, its surrogate parent 
JHU and the Sinhala Ravaya (SR) have formed the BBS-JHU-SR unholy trinity to 
unleash a vicious campaign to terrorise the Muslims, destroy their economy 
and demonize Islam through acts of intimidation, insult, incendiarism, and 
outright thuggery. There are, according to one Muslim journalist, eight 
Sinhalese and ten English language websites that “portray the island’s Muslim 
community as a threat to Sinhalese, Buddhism, Sinhalese culture and the 
country as a whole”41. The unique feature of the fourth wave is that it is taking 
place in the era of the social media, which facilitates the spread of anti-Muslim 
memes42 faster and wider within the Buddhist middle class and youth mindset.       
The destruction of a 400 years old Muslim shrine in Anuradhapura in 2011, the 
demolition of the Khairiya Jumma mosque in Dambulla in 2012, the forceful 
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occupation of Dafther Jailani - another Muslim shrine in Kuragala in 2013 and 
the attack on the Grandpass mosque in Colombo in the same year were the 
most blatant acts of vandalism and Islamophobia unleashed by the BBS-JH-SR 
trinity. In all of them Buddhist monks had participated under the protection of 
the national security forces43.  Among the many Muslim businesses looted and 
destroyed by this mob were two leading textile establishments, Fashion Bug in 
Pepiliyana in March 2013 and Nolimit in Panadura in June 2014. Muslim 
success in retail business has been a menacing eyesore to a number of 
Sinhalese competitors who want to monopolise the country’s retail trade. The 
worst of the violence however, took place in Alutgama, a Muslim town in the 
south, in June 2014 in which 9 Muslims were reported to have been killed, 176 
injured of whom 11 seriously, 86 Muslim shops and 29 Muslim houses burnt 
with another 34 houses and 16 vehicles damaged and 16 shops looted44. An 
Update of “Muslim Concerns” presented by the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress to 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, August 2013 has 
enumerated a total of 241 anti-Muslim incidents between January and 
December 2013 of which 51 were violent.     
Unlike the first three waves the fourth, which continues unabated, has an 
“international dimension” attached to it45.  From the last quarter of the 20th 
century the world of Islam has been in a state of political turmoil. Periodic 
political eruptions in the Middle East and the birth of political Islam in the 
wake of a religious resurgence have sent shock waves around the world and 
impacted the inter-religious and inter-ethnic harmony of several plural 
societies.  Sri Lanka is no exception to this general phenomenon. How these 
developments in the Middle East impacted Sri Lankan Muslims and how it was 
utilised by the advocates of ultra-Buddhist-nationalism in attempting to 
Buddhisize the Sri Lankan economy and polity have already been dealt with 
elsewhere46.  A new international element however - the intrusion of Israel, 
has now added fuel to the anti-Muslim fire.  
The Israel Influence  
Until J.R. Jayewardena decided to “go even to (the) devil to get help” to fight 
the LTTE, and allowed Israel to open an “Interest Section” within the US 
Embassy, Israel’s relations with Sri Lanka had been very marginal. The civil war 
changed all this. During the civil war however the Israelis sold weapons and 
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other military equipment and provided military training not only to the Sri 
Lankan government security forces but also to the LTTE fighting cadre47.  When 
Muslim parliamentarians on the government side protested against 
Jayewardena’s decision he promptly told them, “If the Muslims wanted they 
can remain in the government, otherwise they can leave” 48.  Although the 
Interest Section was closed in June 1990 by Jayewardena’s successor, 
President Premadasa, and diplomatic ties with Israel were discontinued, 
relations resumed in 2000 with Indian mediation49 and Israel’s influence within 
the Buddhist ultranationalists is currently on the rise. Employment 
opportunities provided for Sri Lankans to work as agricultural labourers in 
Israel is a new development that strengthens Israel’s influence even further.   
The BBS-JHU-SR trinity’s claim that Sri Lanka belongs to Buddhism and 
Buddhists only, that Sinhalese should be the only official language, and that 
the minorities are allowed to live in the country only at the behest of the 
Buddhists and even then not on equal terms is similar to the Israeli claims 
about Israel, Jews, Hebrew and the status of Israeli-Arabs. These extremist 
views are not new but they are now propagated more openly and with silent 
support from the state. For the first time in the history of the country BBS in 
August 2014 was able to organize a counter rally in support of Israel on the 
same day when Sri Lankan Tawheed Jamaat organized a pro-Palestinian rally. If 
not the timely action by the Sub- Superintendent of Police “Colombo would 
have gone up in smoke50”. 
The Myanmar Connection 
Soon after the 2013 anti-Muslim riots in Myanmar led by the monk Ashin 
Wiratu - who was identified by the Time magazine of 20 June 2013 as “The 
Face of Buddhist Terror”- and his 969 Buddhist movement BBS was quick to 
establish contacts with him and 969.  There were reciprocal visits between the 
two leaderships. A memorandum of understanding signed between BBS and 
the 969 movement in September 2014 in Sri Lanka marks the culmination of 
this ethno-Buddhist alliance. BBS also sought and failed to form a similar 
alliance with the Indian Hindu nationalist Rashtriya Swayamsevak (RSS) to fight 
Islamic extremism in the region51.  
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Naturally, the Sri Lankan Muslims are alarmed at these developments and are 
even more worried of the passive support the government of the country is 
alleged to be rendering to the anti-Muslim rage of BBS-JHU-SR trinity.    
Issues of Contention 
Forcing halal food on Buddhist consumers through Muslim food outlets, 
proliferation of mosques all over the island, vigorous conversion of Buddhists 
to Islam and a disproportionate growth rate of Muslim population are the main 
issues around which the current anti-Muslim campaign is spinning.  To start 
with, there is absolutely no evidence of Muslims of Sri Lanka force feeding the 
Buddhists with halal food. However, in the multi-billion dollar worth halal food 
global market if Sri Lankan food manufacturers were to compete they have no 
choice but to abide by the halal requirements. Unless the food they export to 
Muslim markets bear the halal label authenticated by a registered halal 
certifier their products will be discarded. In Sri Lanka there are numerous 
Sinhalese Buddhist food manufacturers whose products are entering the 
international market with halal certification. A small proportion of these 
exportables are also allocated for domestic consumption. BBS has maliciously 
picked up these halal products as evidence of halal-force-feeding.  
It is true that the number of mosques in Sri Lanka have multiplied since the 
1980s as part of a worldwide Muslim religious awakening. Muslims all over the 
world have a penchant for building mosques because they believe that there 
are heavenly rewards for such pious acts.  According to information obtained 
from the Department of Muslim Affairs there are about 1800 registered and 
250 unregistered mosques in the country52. Several of these mosques were 
newly built but the majority have been renovated and expanded to 
accommodate an increasing number of worshippers.  Money collected locally 
as well as from diaspora Muslims working in the Gulf countries and donations 
from Arab governments and philanthropists had funded a number mosque 
projects. However, the alien architecture of these mosques and the use of loud 
speakers for adhan or the prayer call have been issues of concern for other 
communities in the country. There had been court cases over the issue of 
adhan53.  Yet, the important factor is that all these mosques have been built on 
land legally obtained from the governments in power.   
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Regarding religious conversion BBS is accusing both Christianity as well as Islam 
for luring the Buddhists to give up their faith and convert to Islam and 
Christianity with promises of employment and marriage.  The same sort of 
objection was raised in India too by the RSS. According to one source a total of 
101,319 people surveyed in 2011 had said to have converted to Islam, up from 
65,755 surveyed in 198154. In a democratic society where there is freedom of 
and from religion one cannot prevent voluntary conversions. There is hardly 
any evidence of forced conversions to Islam in Sri Lanka.  
The most sinister allegation is about the rate of growth of Muslim population. 
This issue also has an international dimension in the sense that journalists like 
Christopher Caldwell uses statistics on birth rates among various communities 
in Europe to raise the alarm that the continent will be swamped by Muslims by 
the middle of the present century55. Study of fertility trends in Sri Lanka indeed 
shows that the Sri Lankan Moors have an edge over the other communities in 
this respect and that their number, if continues to increase at the current rate, 
will overtake the Tamils in 10.5 years and the Sinhalese in 163.65 years56. 
Kannangara therefore advocates that “such pockets of relatively high fertility 
performance” be identified and “specifically designed family planning activities 
suitable for such cultures” be implemented “in order to complement and 
strengthen acceptance of ongoing social change57”. Simplistic statistical 
estimations devoid of deeper analysis into the economic and sociological 
factors that affect demographic transition within different communities had 
provided a pseudo-theoretical edifice to the current anti-Muslim wave.  
Allied to this so called demographic explosion of Muslims is the allegation that 
they are also disproportionately concentrating and thereby causing an ethnic 
imbalance in traditional Sinhalese suburbs like Dehiwela near the capital city of 
Colombo. There are two reasons why this happened over the last two or three 
decades. Firstly, the Muslims of Sri Lanka because of their overwhelming 
interest in trade and commerce have always been more of an urban rather 
than a rural community. Almost all census reports vouch for this fact. However, 
when the open economy was reintroduced after 1977 Colombo once again 
became a magnet for investors, entrepreneurs and businessmen. Secondly, 
when in the 1990s the LTTE began its campaign of ethnic cleansing in the North 
and East many Muslims migrated towards the capital, bought residential 
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properties and settled permanently. As a result Muslim population in the 
Colombo District increased from 9.94 per cent in 1981 to 11.76 per cent in 
2011, whereas the percentage of Buddhists rose slightly from 70.44 to 70.66 in 
the same period. In Dehiwela itself Muslims counted 17,870 out of a total of 
87,834 in 2011, a percentage of 20 as against 60 per cent of Sinhalese58.                
The issues of halal food, multiplicity of mosques, religious conversions and 
population growth rates and internal migration however, are in actual fact 
convenient covers to hide the extremists’ real concern about rising Muslim 
competition in business and education sectors. The open economy ushered in 
after 1977 was a welcome relief to the Muslim businessmen whose economic 
dynamism and commercial enterprise was repressed by the socialist 
experiment of the SLFP Government in the 1960s and 1970s. In the post-1977 
competitive environment Muslim businesses started picking up and some of 
them outbid their Sinhalese and Tamil rivals. Muslim owned retail firms like 
Fashion Bug and Nolimit referred to earlier are prime examples of Muslim 
commercial success, which obviously earned the envy of the Sinhalese petty 
bourgeoisie.  Parallel to this economic revival were the employment 
opportunities that opened up in the Middle East after 1980 which motivated 
even unskilled Muslims to migrate in search of higher earnings.  During the 
presidency of Ranasinghe Premadasa (1989-1993) when public servants with 
more than 20 years of service were allowed to retire, even though their 
pensions were to be paid after the age of fifty-five, many Muslim teachers 
opted to retire and either established their own private businesses or went 
over to the Middle East. Thus, business opportunities at home and 
employment opportunities abroad combined to improve the living conditions 
of at least a minority of Muslim families and they invested their surpluses in 
the booming property market. The BBS and its supporters are now 
campaigning to urge the Sinhalese not to sell property to Muslims.  
By the end of the 1990s the Muslim community has made significant strides in 
the field of education, thanks to the services rendered by the former minister 
of education Badiuddin Mahmud. There is now a class of Muslim professionals 
and young university graduates with competency in all three languages, 
namely Sinhalese, Tamil and English competing for jobs in the private and 
public sectors. It was the English educated Tamils’ domination of the public 
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service in the 1950s that provoked the Sinhalese nationalists at that time to 
introduce the Sinhalese Only Bill in the parliament as a measure of 
guaranteeing public sector jobs to the Sinhalese. Now, the Muslim competitors 
are becoming a new threat to the Sinhalese predominance in public service. On 
7 January 2013 the BBS stormed the Law College at Hultsdorf to protest 
against releasing the examination results alleging that they were distorted to 
favour the Muslims59. This was later investigated and found not to be true. This 
incident clearly indicates the extremists’ worry over Muslim competition in the 
field of education also.  
All this is viewed by the BBS-JHU-SR trinity as signs of rising Muslim dominance 
which the trinity wants to be checked, and hence the anti-Muslim campaign to 
(a) urge Sinhalese consumers to boycott Muslim businesses and property 
owners not to sell property to Musklims, (b) instigate Sinhalese hooligans to 
damage and destroy Muslim buildings and homes, and (c) encourage Sinhalese 
public officials to practice open discrimination against Muslims. A repetition of 
1915 Sinhalese-Muslim riots but on the scale of the 1983 anti-Tamil pogrom is 
not entirely out of the trinity’s short-to-mid-term plan of action60.     
Muslim Response and Future 
Except during the third wave, when at least a section of Muslims of the East 
were allowed to defend their villages and towns against LTTE violence with 
weapons supplied to them under a state sponsored Home Guards security 
measure, the Muslim community never resorted to any chivalrous solution to 
their inter-ethnic or inter-religious issues. Both under British colonial rule as 
well as after independence they always looked to the state for redressing 
grievances. This was the essence of their politics of pragmatism. Even the 
formation of the SLMC did not deviate from this peaceful strategy. There were 
two factors that acted as a kind of safety-valve that protected the Muslims 
from violence caused by Sinhalese extremism.  One was their position as the 
second minority and the psychological fear that haunted the Buddhist mindset 
for centuries about the political threat from the first minority, the Tamils. 
Protracted anti-Muslim violence from the majority community always carried 
the danger of a possible alliance between the two minorities which would be 
more formidable to encounter politically; and the other was the concern about 
international Muslim reaction – the “external dimension” - to anti-Muslim 
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violence at home. With a comprehensive military defeat over the LTTE 
followed by delicate diplomatic manoeuvers to keep the Indian quarter 
quiescent on the Tamil issue the Tamil fear appears to have virtually melted, 
but the concern about international Muslim reaction still carries some weight.  
According to one journalist, “if not for that external dimension … the fate of 
the Muslims might today have been much worse61”. In fact in April 2013 
President Rajapakse met the resident heads of fifteen Muslim countries and 
assured them that he would not tolerate any disturbance to religious harmony 
in Sri Lanka62.  
Can the Muslim community rely on this external dimension for its future safety 
and peaceful coexistence in the country?  At least two historical experiences 
from two different contexts demonstrate that such reliance has only limited 
value. The first experience comes from the Sri Lankan Tamil community that 
relied very heavily on both the Indian central and Tamil Nadu state 
governments for support to their struggle. A detailed discussion on the 
vagaries of Indian responses is beyond the scope of this analysis; but from the 
author’s personal contacts with diaspora Tamils it becomes clear that they are 
frustratingly disappointed at the Indian quiescence so far. The second 
experience is from the Palestinian reliance on the Arab countries in their 
struggle for an independent state. Here again the outcome has been abysmally 
poor.  The reality is that in the operation of the current post-Westpahalian 
nation state structure it is the promotion of national interest that remains 
paramount to every government and that the interest of outsiders, unless they 
directly impinge upon the national interest, receive only peripheral concern. 
This is the real politik that minorities face.  
Given this fact it will be an uphill task for local minorities to motivate their 
ethnic or religious foreign brethren to come to their aid in times of crisis. In the 
case of the Sri Lankan Muslim community, foreign Muslim governments can 
only provide limited assistance to ameliorate the current painful experience.  
The real and long lasting solution has to be indigenous. With inflationary 
pressures on peoples’ living standards, acute joblessness amongst the 
educated and unchecked political authoritarianism even the majority 
community is now realising that ethnic politics is the bane of Sri Lanka. Only a 
broad coalition of progressive forces comprising of all ethnic communities can 
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bring peace and prosperity to the supposed “Thomas More’s Socialist 
Utopia”63. The future of the Muslim community therefore depends on whether 
it is prepared to give up its own post-1990 ethno-religiouscentric politics and 
move towards a secular national coalition. This requires a visionary leadership 
from the community which unfortunately appears to be in short supply at the 
moment.        
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